The article provides an overview of ongoing research and key characteristics of Cognitive 
Centre for Cognitive Semiotics (CCS), Lund University
The Centre for Cognitive Semiotics at Lund University is a six-year program (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) , bringing together researchers from semiotics, linguistics, cognitive science, and related disciplines on a common meta-theoretical platform of concepts, methods, and shared empirical data (http://project.ht.lu.se/en/ccs/). A staff of 10-15 senior and post-doctoral researchers and a larger number of affiliates coordinate their research under five interrelated themes -evolution, ontogeny, history, typology, and experimental psychology -adopting as much as possible a CS approach to their specific topic. For example, the typology theme deals not only with linguistic typology but also with patterns of correlation in multiple "semiotic resources" such as speech, writing, gestures, pictures, music, and cultural artifacts.
The research director of CCS, Göran Sonesson, states: "I have been involved with phenomenological cognitive semiotics from the very start of my career without knowing itor rather, without using the term" (Sonesson 2009: 108 ). Sonesson's writings since the late 1970s, in particular his comprehensive monograph Pictorial Concepts (1989) , can indeed be seen as forerunners of CS in several respects. In particular, he has consistently argued for the primacy of perceptual meaning over other kinds of meaning -including signs -and elaborated a definition of the sign concept on the basis of phenomenological notions such as experienced asymmetry and differentiation. At the same time, Sonesson has maintained that the study of meaning cannot be purely "eidetic" or "autonomous" but must also be based on psychological studies. For the purposes of his analyses of pictorial signs (his specialty), he often refers to Gestalt psychology as well as the ecological psychology of the Gibsonian tradition.
Still, CS cannot be based only on a meta-analysis of the results of the cognitive sciences; for it to come into its own, it should go hand in hand with them to motivate specific empirical studies. In this sense, CS research at Lund University got underway during the first years of the millennium, thanks to collaboration between Sonesson and researchers from linguistics such as the present author and cognitive scientists, such as Tomas Persson, a primatologist who applies CS concepts to the study visual perception and pictorial competence in nonhuman primates (Persson 2008) .
My own road towards CS has been guided by the conviction that language -its nature, evolution and development -cannot be understood outside the context of a more general approach, taking both meaning and mind seriously. Influenced by the work of Merlin Donald (see below), I have tried to elaborate the concept of bodily mimesis, arguing for its central role in both ontogeny and evolution (e.g., Zlatev 2008) . More recently, I have struggled with the proverbially "hard problem" of consciousness. In agreement with Sonesson, I see phenomenology as providing tools to address the complex interrelations between bodily experience, sociality, and language (Zlatev 2010) . Consistent with the work of Thompson (2007, see below) , one may formulate an evolutionary "semiotic hierarchy": the autopoiesis of living systems is at the basis of all meaning in the universe, followed by the emergence of conscious experience (at least with mammals), which on its side is a precondition for the evolution of sign use (emerging with Homo erectus) and speech (in our own species). Such evolution is essentially bio-cultural, with cultural processes playing a leading role in the evolution of language.
A number of empirical studies on mimetic schemas and children's gestural development have been carried out (e.g., Zlatev and Andrén 2009 ). Mats Andrén's (2010) PhD Thesis
Children's Gestures Between 18 and 30
Months is the group's most synthetic fruit so far. In it, Andrén provides detailed descriptions of five Swedish children's gestural repertoires in the tradition of Adam Kendon (see below), with CS concepts serving to delineate gestures from action and "body language" on the one hand and from signed language on the other.
Quantitative analyses show patterns in the developmental trajectories of pointing, iconic, and emblematic gestures with respect to speech and the use of physical objects. The study substantiates claims for an intimate interrelation between and parallel development of speech and gesture.
For reasons of space and fairness, the research of all CCS researchers cannot be summarized here. To give a flavor of the variety of subjects pursued, I mention the research by Gerd Carling and Arthur Holmer on correlations between linguistic and other semiotic resources in Amazonia; Junichi Toyota on possible interactions between religious beliefs and tense-aspect systems; Anastasia Karlsson on prosody and information structure in East Asian and Southeast Asian languages; Sara Lenninger on the development of children's use of pictures; Anna Cabak Rédei and Lars Kopp on visual perception and emotion; Gunnar Sandin on the affordances and signs of city architecture; Joel Parthemore on enactive concepts; Elainie Madsen on contagious yawning in apes, canines and great cats; Michael Ranta on visual narratives... If successfully integrated -the major challenge to CCS -such research can serve as the basis for a viable CS tradition at Lund University. As a further step, it will be necessary to secure the program's "cultural transmission" through an MA program such as that of CfS.
Research Topics

Gesture
The study of gestures -involving various degrees and kinds of iconicity, indexicality, and conventionality -has from the start called for a more or less explicit semiotic analysis (cf. Kendon 2004) . Efron (1941) and later Bouissac (1973) provided some early proposals for how such analyses could be made more systematic, in part through the availability of new technology for recording and analysis. During the 1980s, thanks to the concerted work of Adam Kendon (1980 ) and David McNeill (1992 , gesture studies began to emerge as a more or less independent interdisciplinary field.
McNeill's approach is more explicitly psychological, with references to developmental and neuroscientific evidence and links to cognitive linguistic concepts such as image schemas and conceptual metaphors. His long-time concern is the integration of gesture and speech in a single cognitive system, though with a degree of division of semiotic labor: gesture being more "imagistic" and speech/language more propositional. In Gesture and Thought (2005) ,
McNeill echoes Vygotsky's classic Language and Thought and argues for a broader concept of language, combining the more static and systematic aspects of Saussure's langue with a more dynamic and imagistic side, made visible above all through gesture.
At the same time, it is fair to say that the influence of Kendon's work runs deeper, both for gesture studies and CS. Originally working in ethology and then in human interaction, Kendon has over the years developed a framework -or perhaps a style -of analyzing live, multimodal interaction that is difficult to match in terms of sensitivity to relevant detail.
Combined with a "comparative semiotic" method, his studies of face-to-face interaction, alternate signed languages in Australian aborigines, and gestures of Neapolitaneans are considered classics in the field. Many of these are summarized in his magnum opus Gesture: (Cienki & Müller 2008) .
Child development
As mentioned in the introduction, the pioneering figures in developmental psychology clearly adopted a cognitive-semiotic approach by investigating interrelations between sensorimotor skills, imitation, imagination, and communicative signs (Piaget) ; or between thought, "inner speech", and the semiotic mediation of cognition and development by socio-culturally transmitted sign systems (Vygotsky). This tradition underwent a significant renewal in the 1970s through the work of (among others) Trevarthen, Bruner and Sinha (see below).
Subsequently, however, the child's mind was "modularized" and "nativized" and it became unfashionable to look for "domain general" capacities, stages, and transitions. Language and cognition were to be kept apart and studied separately.
If we fast-forward to the present, the picture looks quite different, with body, affect, and socio-cultural environment all seen as indispensable for growing minds. Colwyn Trevarthen's long-term research and theorizing on infant and child intersubjectivity (Trevarthen 1979; Bråten and Trevarthen 2007) has been one of the key inspirations for this turn. In collaboration with Stein Bråten and others, Trevarthen has described the first years of development as characterized by increasingly complex layers or levels of intersubjective engagement with others in "trusting relations of companionship" (see Table 1 ). Inspired by Julia Kristeva, Ulrike Lüdtke (2012) adds to these a zero layer of "primordial intersubjectivity" preceding birth; she conceptualizes the progression as one of decreasing corporeality and emotional markedness with increasing abstraction and referentiality. Daniel
Stern (2000) has likewise emphasized interpersonal relations and emotion, contributing to puncturing (if not tearing down) the wall between therapeutic and cognitive psychologythereby making it possible to argue that emotional contact and sympathetic interaction serve as "the cradle of thought" (Hobson 1996) . Development. Sinha builds on Piagetian and Vygotskyan ideas to develop an experimentally supported "pragma-semiotic" account of language development and evolution within a general theoretical approach named "epigenetic socionaturalism". Sinha has contributed to the "social turn" in Cognitive Linguistics (Harder 2010) , including the use of cross-cultural and ecologically valid data. He has addressed the evolution of language as a "bio-cultural niche and social institution" (Sinha 2010) .
From the side of semiotics proper, development has been insightfully addressed by Patricia
Violi. Inspired by the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, Violi (2012) argues for an extended sense of "embodiment", in which the body itself becomes enculturated, as well as "extended" through artifacts.
Bio-cultural evolution
As long recognized, there is an intimate relationship between the development of individuals and the evolution of species. One of the insights of the "new synthesis" of developmental and evolutionary biology (evo-devo) is that "all important changes in evolution are alternations in development" (Thompson 2007: 195) . Modern concepts of evolution have moved beyond the (ex-) "modern synthesis" focused on gene selection, to consider that evolution can take place on many levels (such as groups): relaxing, if not erasing, the differences between biological and cultural evolution.
Several theoreticians with a background in neuropsychology and developmental psychology have addressed the perennial question of the "descent of man" within an extended, biocultural perspective on evolution, often explicitly involving concepts from semiotics. An important publication in the area is Merlin Donald's (1991) Origins of the Modern Mind:
Three Stages in the Evolution of Human Culture, presenting an integrated bio-cultural theory of human evolution. A key idea is that a domain-general capacity for skill learning, imitation, and gestural communication lies at the roots of uniquely human cognition and semiosis:
"Mimetic skills or mimesis rests on the ability to produce conscious, self-initiated, representational acts that are intentional but not linguistic" (Donald 1991: 168) . Speech and language evolved only later, partly through cultural evolution, without relying on innate adaptations. External representations gave way to writing in relatively recent history, making what Donald calls "theoretical culture" possible. Even from this brief summary, it can be seen that Donald's approach is clearly cognitive-semiotic: the goal is to understand not only the "origins of the modern mind" but how new semiotic layers have transformed that mind into the unique "hybrid" construction that it is (see also Donald 2001) . The role of artifacts, external representations and technology in general for "supersizing the mind" (Clark 2008) has been discussed for some time, and is on one level generally acknowledged. However, the more precise nature of artifacts and technology in relation to thinking has been the subject of controversies in philosophy ("internalism vs. externalism") and cognitive science ("extended mind") and can therefore be pinpointed as a target area for future CS research. draws on ideas from Peirce to propose that interpretative processes follow a progression of iconism (i.e. recognition), indexicality (space-time contiguity, as in the pairing of stimulus and response in classical conditioning), and most complexly -indeed, unique to our speciessymbols. What Deacon exactly means by "symbols" has been a matter of much discussion. He has attempted to clarify this recently: "To interpret the wax impression as a symbol of social position, one must also understand these social conventions, because nothing intrinsic to the form or its physical creation supplies this information. The symbolic reference is dependent on already knowing something beyond any features embodied in this sign vehicle" (Deacon, in press). Thus, it is not arbitrariness per se that makes a sign into a symbol but culturally shared knowledge, which Deacon often describes as constituting a "web of symbolic relationships" -at least implicitly drawing on the structuralist tradition emanating from influential. Tomasello prefers to stay in a more mainstream current of psychology and cognitive science and refrains from using terms such as "signs", "semiosis", and "consciousness". Still, his key concepts include symbols, joint attention and shared intentionality and it does not require much to see his theories in a CS context. Being heavily dependent on experimental results, Tomasello's ideas have changed over the years. Human cognition is no longer characterized by "understanding intentions" but rather by a combination of motivational factors for sharing (from food to attention and knowledge) and a cognitive capacity for maintaining joint commitments. Thus, it can be said that Tomasello's ideas on infant intersubjectivity have largely converged with those of Trevarthen and others, outlined earlier. In emphasizing the role of gestures in establishing a basis for language evolution, Tomasello's evolutionary theory is also reminiscent of Donald's.
Thus, there appears to be an emerging consensus that what is distinct to our species -both cognitively and semiotically -is a unique form of sociality. Still, few have attempted an explanation of the evolutionary conditions that would lead to this. Deacon (1997) has speculated that it could have been a change in reproductive strategy: from polygamy (typical among the great apes) to monogamy. This, however, is unsupported by the archeological evidence and at least controversial for the anthropological evidence: (serial) monogamy seems a much more recent, culturally transmitted, non-universal phenomenon. A more persuasive argument for the evolution of a human-specific form of intersubjectivity is presented by Sarah
Hrdy in Mothers and Others: The Evolutionary Origins of Mutual Understanding (2009).
Reviewing the ethological, anthropological, and developmental psychology literatures, Hrdy builds up a case for the proposal that the crucial reproductive turn that occurred with Homo erectus nearly two million years ago was not to monogamy but to alloparenting or "cooperative breeding". That would account both for the greater gregariousness of our species towards non-relatives and the willingness of infants to bond and communicate with other than biological parents.
"The Embodied Mind"
In parallel with -and similar to -the rapprochement between the cognitive sciences on the one hand and "semiotics and the humanities" on the other, as outlined above, there has been a movement of integrating ideas and methods from cybernetics, theoretical biology, and Varela played a key role in establishing the Embodied Mind paradigm. With his background in theoretical biology and in collaboration with Humberto Maturana, Varela co-authored some of the key ideas of autopoiesis theory: "Our proposition is that living beings are characterized in that, literally, they are continually self-producing. We indicate this process when we call the organization that defines them an autopoietic organization" (Maturana & Varela 1987: 43) . For reasons that still need to be clarified, there was a rift between the two scholars around that time. Varela proceeded to elaborate the related notion of enaction (Varela et al. 1991) and, importantly, to link his biological theory with a deeper appreciation of phenomenology than present in the 1991 volume. In an oft-quoted paper, Varela (1996) applications -are presented to a broader audience. This is something that CS would clearly benefit from emulating.
Characteristics of Cognitive Semiotics
On the basis of the (non-comprehensive) overview in the previous two sections, one can discern a number of characteristics of CS research. These can serve to narrow down the broad definition of CS as "integrating methods and theories developed in… cognitive science with methods and theories developed in semiotics and the humanities". At the same time, they are not meant as a "classical" definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions but rather as a prototype-based one: i.e., not every CS practitioner should commit to all of the following five features.
A productive combination of (semiotic) theory and empirical research
In a broad (and trivial) sense, all research is both theoretical and empirical. However, semiotic theory is particularly concerned with explicating higher-order concepts such as meaning, sign use, representation, language, intersubjectivity, etc., along with their interrelations. It is anything but trivial to bring in empirical research that both contributes to such an explication and, at the same time, benefits from it in a way that produces new insights. It is such "mutual enlightenment" -in the words of Evan Thompson -that is the central characteristic of CS. All who have been involved in the study of phenomena such as imagination, gesture, metaphor, etc. will know that it is anything but trivial to combine conceptual and empirical analyses of their nature. There is a natural pull, one could say, to treat these as meaningful phenomena and explicate their features, constituent structures, types, etc. by engaging in systematic conceptual/eidetic analysis. On the other hand, psychologists tend to rush to "operationalize" the concepts, formulate hypotheses, perform experiments, and arrive at theoretical conclusions. But the outcome has often been that behind the same terms (e.g. "imagery", "motion" and "symbol") very different, and often diffuse, concepts have been lurking, with resultant cross-talk both across and within disciplines.
How is CS to avoid this? The answer lies in formulating concrete research programs such as neurophenomenology that not only state programmatically that the "methods and theories" of the humanities and sciences need to be integrated but actually go ahead and do it. This is important enough to be listed as separate feature.
Methodological triangulation
At the heart of my own conception of CS is the kind of methodological "triangulation" shown in Table 2 From the perspective of CS, the problem with the "classical" humanities has been a resolute rejection of third-person methods in the study of cultural world as, at best, limited, and at worse as "objectivist" and distorting of the phenomena. While much can be said in favor of such a critique, the steady progress of the sciences, including the study of the "mind/brain", has given such an attitude a distinctly old-fashioned -if not reactionary -flavor. But on its side, (natural) science has tended to be myopic and dogmatic and has, unsurprisingly, hit a wall in extending the Galilean method to issues of value, meaning, norm and consciousness. It has also performed first-person and second-person methods implicitly, often without knowing it: you will not find sections on the use of intuition and empathy in the "methods" section of experimental psychology textbooks.
The challenges to success in practicing such non-reductive unification of knowledge are many -not the least institutional. CS runs the risk of being caught it the crossfire between the traditionalism of the humanities and the hubris of the sciences. But on the positive side, CS could make a contribution to "mending the gap between science and the humanities": the subtitle of the last book of the evolutionary scientist Stephen Jay Gould (2003) .
Influence of phenomenology
Another common aspect to most CS research is a greater or lesser degree of indebtedness to the philosophical school of phenomenology, as founded by Edmund Husserl at the beginning of the 20 th century. There are multiple schools and types of phenomenology, but the basic idea is to depart from experience itself, and to provide descriptions of the phenomena of the world, including ourselves and others, as true to experience as possible -rather than constructing metaphysical doctrines, following formal procedures, or postulating invisible-toconsciousness causal mechanisms that would somehow "produce" experience.
There is a continuity between the epistemological challenges of CS outlined above, and those dealt with by Husserl, leading him to develop phenomenology as a possible resolution to what he called the "crisis of European sciences", caught between the extremes of positivism and relativism. The emphasis on perspective in Table 2 was meant as a reminder that all knowledge is relative to a subject -or an "observer" as Humberto Maturana likes to phrase it (though not as dependent on language as assumed in his theory). This does not entail any form of "monadic" subjectivism for at least three reasons. First, we do not live in separate bubbles involved? Judging from the background of CS practitioners, one can single out (1) semiotics (whether or not it should be seen as a single discipline), (2) linguistics (approaches viewing meaning as the essence of language), (3) psychology (mostly developmental, but also cultural, cognitive, and comparative), (4) anthropology (biological and, hopefully, cultural, despite its deeply ingrained resistance to "biologism"), (5) enactive cognitive science (including neuroscientific and dynamic modeling approaches), and (6) More important for the self-definition of CS is whether it should involve a lower or higher degree of interdisciplinarity. A higher degree is often called transdisciplinarity, especially by those who see "interdisciplinarity" as a temporary coalition between members of different fields when something of considerable complexity is addressed (e.g., the brain as studied by neuroscience or evolution as studied by sociobiology) but without seriously affecting the participant disciplines or the broader field of knowledge. In contrast, transdisciplinarity "concerns that which is at once between the disciplines, across the different disciplines, and beyond each individual discipline. Its goal is the understanding of the present world, of which one of the imperatives is the overarching unity of knowledge" (Transdisciplinarity, Wikipedia, August 17, 2011) . From such a perspective, CS can be seen as an emerging transdisciplinary field: meaning does not constitute a specific empirical domain but rather cuts "between and across" disciplines. What has so far lain "beyond" is a coherent approach that "mends the gap between science and the humanities", in the words of Gould. As I wrote with some rhetorical flourish some years ago: "Our conception of meaning has become increasingly fragmented, along with much else in the increasing 'postmodernization' of our worldview. The trenches run deep between different kinds of meaning theories: mentalist, behaviorist, (neural) reductionist, (social) constructivist, functionalist, formalist, computationalist, deflationist… And they are so deep that a rational debate between the different camps seems impossible. The concept is treated not only differently but incommensurably within the different disciplines" (Zlatev 2003: 253) . To the extent that CS lives up to the challenge of providing a coherent worldview uniting "biology, phenomenology and the sciences of mind" (in the words of Thompson) and even offering a foundation for the systematic study of fields such as visual art and music, it would deserve the label "transdisciplinary field".
Furthermore, a feature often seen as crucial for transdisciplinary research is "the inclusion of stakeholders in defining research objectives and strategies in order to better incorporate the diffusion of learning produced by the research. Collaboration between stakeholders is deemed essential -not merely at an academic or disciplinary collaboration level, but through active collaboration with people affected by the research and community-based stakeholders" (Transdisciplinarity, Wikipedia, August 17, 2011) . It is fair to say that, so far, CS has not achieved this, though there have been encouraging first attempts: Smith's work with producers, consumer rights advocates, and legal experts in the Fairspeak project; work in
Lund with minorities such as the Roma, on issues of group identity and integration; work in Århus on multiculturalism. Areas of crucial social significance, in which CS -with its participatory approach to knowledge -should be able to involve stakeholders include atypical development (e.g., autism), sex and gender, animal rights, and religion: notably all highly "sensitive" domains characterized by polarized views. Clearly, an approach such as CS, with its promise of mending the gap, could be beneficial.
Conclusions
The fact that similar ideas -and even the term "cognitive semiotics" itself -have emerged in different places over the last decades is hardly a coincidence. At some risk of exaggeration, CS can be seen as called for by historical needs, such as those suggested in this article: the need to unify or at least to "defragment" our world-views, the need to come to terms with increasingly higher levels of dynamism and complexity, the need to understand better -and thus deal with -the dialectical relationship between individual freedom (autonomy) and collective dependence (sociality), etc.
In other words, if Cognitive Semiotics did not exist, we would need to invent it. Its potential as a transdisciplinary field integrating our understanding of life, mind, language and society is considerable. Furthermore, it can help integrate the participating disciplines internally -above all psychology and linguistics, divided as they are in conflicting sub-disciplines that treat their objects of study (i.e., mind and language) in, respectively, biological, mental, and sociocultural terms. To emphasize again: CS is not a branch, school, or theory of semiotics, the latter understood as a self-contained discipline. It can make equal use of ideas from Peirce, Saussure, Jakobson, Greimas, von Uexküll -or from anywhere else -to the extent that those ideas are productive for empirical research leading to new insights into the nature (and culture) of human beings, as well as other meaning-seeking and meaning-making beings. It could perhaps be better called "semiotic cognitive/mind science", if the phrase were not so cumbersome and "science" not so often taken to refer solely to natural science.
